

1965 Indo-Pakistan War: An Overview



Muhammad Hassan

Visiting Lecturer, Department of Pakistan Study, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan. muhammadhassaan142@gmail.com

Abstract: *Kashmir is the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan. It is the base of strained relations between both countries. Multiple talks and dialogues happened between the high officials of India and Pakistan but the issue remained unresolved. A major shift began in 1963 when the hair of Muhammad (S.A.W) was stolen from Hazrat Bal Mosque of Indian Occupied Kashmir. In 1964, Shiekh Abdullah was released and in 1965, he moved on foreign visit to Middle Eastern Countries where he presented the grievances of Indian Kashmiris and spoke about the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people. On such act of Shiekh Abdullah, he was re-imprisoned in May 1965. Before the imprisonment of Shiekh Abdullah, small skirmishes happened on Rann of the Kutch region, a border area between the Indian State of Gujrat and the Sindh Province of Pakistan. However, Pakistan protected its territory and deterred Indian Forces. In June 1965, the Boundary Commission was set up to decide on the border issue of India and Pakistan in which they awarded a large border area to India. Operation Gibraltar was planned which aimed to galvanize revolt within Kashmir and this would provide an opportunity for Pakistan to occupy the remaining part of Kashmir. This strategy failed, resulting in the capture of Guriella who were planted by Pakistan for the galvanization of revolt in Kashmir. When Guriella forces were captured by India, this led to the beginning of the War between India and Pakistan. This research paper has discussed the entire scenario of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 in detail.*

Keywords: Indo-Pakistan, Kashmir, War, Rann, Kutch

Introduction

This research paper attempts to critically analyze the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, it will investigate the consequences faced by Pakistan after the war. In this war, Kashmir was the cause of the initiation of this war. In this research work, the researcher will provide a comprehensive detail about the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war in chronological order, besides also investigate how much this war affected the Kashmir dispute between two states which was a main source of confrontation between both states since independence in 1947. Moreover, it will discuss the skirmishes that took place on Rann of Kutch, its aftermath, and its effects on Pakistan. The researchers also

discussed the military operation launched by both the countries before and during the war. Despite it has also discussed the involvement of major powers in this war.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A bulk of the literature has been produced on the 1965 War in Pakistan their few glimpses are discussed below.

Askari described that the 1965 War brokered as giving response to Pakistan for its mistake of infiltrating its trained soldiers into Indian Occupied Kashmir to arouse the emotions of revolt among them. He further explained Indian Army came across the Ceasefire line on 1st September 1965 and occupied three posts at

Kargil, Haji Pir, and Tithwal areas, different areas of Western Punjab were focused to be occupied by Indian Army. He further explained that in the 1965 War Pakistan showed its courage in front of the strengthened Indian Army while the war strategies of both countries were not different from each other because the military of both countries were trained by the same British institutions (Rizvi, 2013).

Wynbrandt is of the view that Pakistan became victorious in the Rann of Kutch War in April 1965, Pakistan under such situation considering the Indian Army was weak, therefore, Pakistan trained Mujahideen to infiltrate into Kashmir to galvanize them for revolt, if revolt began, the Mujahideen would be armored, but unfortunately this plan was failed. He described the second incident about Kashmir when Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was implementing Presidential Rule in Kashmir, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah President of Indian Occupied Kashmir was arrested for not allowing Indian efforts in his territory. He further illuminates that the people of Azad Kashmir protested against such a move of the Indian Government, in retaliation for Azad Kashmir's protest, the Indian Army launched an offensive attack and crossed the ceasefire line as a consequence of which a full-fledged war incepted between India and Pakistan (Wynbrandt, 2009).

Ziring illustrates that after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, Pakistan considered India to be demoralized and underestimated their Military capabilities, consequently the infiltrators were sent to Kashmir on 8th August 1965. He explained that after getting victory in the Rann of Kutch War Pakistan unfortunately observed India as a demoralized country after the death of Nehru. He made Bhutto responsible for the initiating 1965 War because he was neither informed of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)'s plan under the operation code name *Operation Gibraltar* nor informed by Ayub Khan; the 1965 War vitiated Ayub's authority and weakened his administration. Furthermore, the Pakistani infiltrators were captured by the Indian Army and Police in Indian Occupied Kashmir (Ziring, Pakistan: At

the Crosscurrent of History, 2003).

Ganguly considered the infiltration in Kashmir by Pakistan responsible for starting this conflict. He described that when Indian Forces crossed the ceasefire line and captured northern mountainous spots Pakistan in reaction moved to the Indian Sector of Kashmir and captured Uri, Poonch, and Tithwal areas. Furthermore, India launched an offensive attack on the southern sector of Pakistan, Lahore and Sialkot were the main battlefields of this war. He further argued that Indian Forces also captured some villages in the surroundings of Lahore in which Pakistan got the victory, The Indian tank battle launched in Sialkot was also defended by Pakistan but the Pakistan Army failed to capture the Akhnoor area of Kashmir. Moreover, India did not achieve their objectives of occupying Lahore and Sialkot areas (Ganguly S. , 1988).

The researcher has studied the bulk of the literature but did not find anything about the said topic. Therefore there is a knowledge gap, to find out that gap, the researchers will analyze the 1965 War, to find out the nations with great loss in this War.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem states that Pakistan did not plan well Operation Gibraltar; they should have trained the Freedom Fighters keenly about the local language of Indian Kashmir and about their currency which became the reason for defeating Operation Gibraltar but Ayub Khan still allowed to initiate Operation Gibraltar.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This research topic has significance for the readers because this research paper provides information about the 1965 war in chronological order and as well as identifies the gains and losses of India and Pakistan in this war.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What was the role of the Pakistan Navy and Airforce of East Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War?
- What was the stance of China on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War?

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- To identify the role of the Pakistan Navy and Airforce in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
- To find out the stance of China on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.

ORIGIN OF THE 1965 WAR

Both countries India and Pakistan involved in an unplanned war on the borders of Rann of Kutch in April 1965. In this unplanned war, a barren and disputed territory of Pakistan was attacked by India but they were captured by Pakistan. Pakistan considered it a military victory and attempted to occupy Indian Kashmir as Pakistan considered the Indian Military a fragile one. On 30th June 1965, the United Nations Security Council contributed and froze this war but Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri warned that India would soon attack Pakistan but its time and place would be decided by India. This warning aimed to give caution to Pakistan to prepare their military for the defense of Pakistan (Amin, 2007). Later, on 27th May 1965, with the demise of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan considered that national unity and national integration would be difficult for India to maintain, therefore, Pakistan launched an ill-planned Operation Gibraltar in which they sent up to 7000 Pakistani Armed Personnel Guerilla Freedom Fighters across ceasefire line to Indian Occupied Kashmir for the aim of starting Muslim uprising against Indian Government but the operation failed and Pakistan faced its consequences in shape full-fledged war in September 1965 (Malik, 2019).

1. PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS FROM 1947-1965

1.1. KASHMIR PROBLEM AND RELATIONS WITH INDIA FROM 1947-1950

Indian Subcontinent was composed of 562 princely states amongst these 422 states were under the statesmanship of the British Government and 140 princely states were fully empowered to rule according to their state policies. The largest states among them were Kashmir, Mysore, and Hyderabad having a larger population and large territory as

compared to the other princely states (Ali C. M., 1985). In the 3rd June Plan, these states were given the choice either to join India or Pakistan but in accordance to the religious majority of its population either Hindu majority or Muslim majority and geographical position to be observed as to which dominion the princely state is nearer. The Maharaja of Kashmir decided to remain neutral, on this decision the Muslim population revolted joined by tribal people of NWFP (Mangrio, 2012). In such pressure, Maharaja of Kashmir demanded shelter from India, they provided it but on the condition to accede the State of Jammu and Kashmir with India. Maharaja of Kashmir acceded the State on 26th October 1947. Indian Government filed a complaint on the interference of tribesmen of NWFP in the dispute under Article 35 of Study VI of the United Nations Charter, with UN interference ceasefire line having a 720-kilometer length stretched between both the states. Later in April 1948, India stopped the flow of Indus River Water to Pakistan to provide setback to agricultural land of Sindh and Punjab provinces in Pakistan (Ashraf, 2015).

1.2. RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN FROM 1950-1964

During 1950 and 1951, India deployed troops on the ceasefire line but Pakistan showed signs of peace and did not react to such a decision of India. Pakistan therefore joined American military alliances in 1953 which are Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1953) South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO 1954), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO 1955), and the Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (1959) to counter not only the Indian aggression but also the Russian influence from the north. In 1953, an attempt was made to constitutionally integrate Kashmir with India but the local people of Kashmir had a negative attitude towards Indian Government and towards those in Kashmir who were supported by India. The elections during 1957 and 1962 were declared by the Kashmiris as unfair and impartial and did not accept the results of those elections (Sayeed, 1967). In 1953, a joint communiqué took place between Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and his counterpart

Jawaharlal Lal Nehru, in this communiqué it was decided that the future of Kashmir was to be resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people through fair and impartial plebiscite. In 1954, when Pakistan joined the American military alliances, India refused to negotiate on Kashmir and reacted because it did not want Western interference in South Asian affairs. When Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan, in 1959 he proposed to hold a Joint Defence Pact for the settlement of Kashmir but India rejected it because Pakistan was part of American Alliances while India was also receiving Military Aid from the United States as well as from Soviet Union. When in 1962, Sino-Pakistan alliances took place, President Kennedy warned India to keep an eye on Pakistan and also informed Ayub Khan that India kept an eye on Pakistan after the Sino-Pakistan alliance. During the same year, arrangements of direct talks happened to resolve the matters responsible for the animosity among the two countries. In 1963, the hair of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) was stolen from Hazratbal Mosque at Srinagar Jammu which was followed by an anti-Indian tenor then in 1964 Jawaharlal Nehru died and Pakistan considered that India would be destabilized by its caste system (Ganguly S. , 1996).

Another discussion also took place between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute and later on 5th January 1964, India declared that they were not ready to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. (Shah, 2006). On 8th April 1964, the Indian Government released Shiekh Abdullah but India sent him to Pakistan for the diplomatic mission. The mission was to negotiate with President Ayub Khan to resolve the Kashmir dispute but to convert Pakistan to a confederated state, Ayub Khan on account of this told to America that Pakistan desired to see Kashmir as an independent state but Pakistan would not convert its state from Federation to Confederation (Afzal, 2007).

1.3. RANN OF KUTCH APRIL 1965

A Rann of Kutch is located in the East of Pakistan and West of India while the Gulf of Kutch and Indian Ocean is in its south. It is a landlocked sea during monsoon season. The area

of this territory was 8461 meters. During Independence in 1947, the territory was under the control of Pakistan but in 1956 India occupied its Northern part. Indian suspicious moves were under the observation of Pakistan Ranger but they could not show any resistance. On 16th March 1965, Sardar port was established while on such occasion Major General Tikka Khan gave direction to the 6th brigade at Quetta to be prepared for moving forward to Umar Kot. On the night of 5th April 1965, the Indian Army began advancing towards the Pakistan sector to Mara and Ding lakes, Commander of 51 Brigade, Brigadier Muhammad Azhar Ali ordered to resist if the Indian Army showed any aggression. Pakistan in the first phase of conflict captured 21 Indian soldiers. Pakistan was consistent and decided not to withdraw its troops, they began to initiate plan Alpha, and the Indian forces were getting supplies from Air in the Northern part of Rann of Kutch. Later Ayub Khan decided to resolve the dispute through peaceful means and political negotiation began as a result a ceasefire agreement took place on 30th June 1965, and this came to an end (Ali L. A., 2009). During the War of Rann of Kutch, India was defeated by the Pakistan Army they were unable to recapture posts occupied by Pakistan, so they took defense measures but did not initiate them, on becoming victorious in this conflict Ayub's ministers thought that they should have to move to Kashmir and must have to occupy it which later turn into a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan (Asim, 2020).

On 3rd June 1965, the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Tribunal constituted by the Secretary General of the United Nations appointed Swedish Judge named Gunner Lagergren; two delegations were sent one to New Delhi India, and another to Islamabad, Pakistan for observing the maps to reach the final decision. After thorough deliberation on 19th February 1968, in Nagar Parker, Dharra Bhani, and Chhad Bet areas, approximately 10% of the Rann of Kutch area was given to Pakistan and 90% were awarded to India. Under this arbitration award, the Rann of Kutch dispute was resolved (Ali M. , 2012).

2. OPERATION GIBRALTAR

Pakistan observed that India had been defeated by China in 1962 in the Sino-India border wars. Moreover, Pakistan's wrong perception was that Kashmiris were disheartened by India about the Hazratbal Mosque incident, and in the same year Nehru was demised, Pakistan thought that India might indulge in a caste system that would destabilize and disintegrate India. Pakistan itself defeated India in the Rann of Kutch Skirmish of April 1965. Therefore, Pakistan overconfidently initiated Operation Gibraltar and on such grounds, Pakistan infiltrated in Indian Occupied Kashmir through Freedom Fighters (Chawla, 2008).

2.1. SHIEKH ABDULLAH'S ARREST, REVOLT IN KASHMIR, AND INDIAN ATTACK ON KARGIL SECTOR

The story of Operation Gibraltar took place in such a way that Sheikh Abdullah toured on foreign visits where he spoke about Kashmiri grievances and Indian aggressions on Kashmir territory, when he toured Saudi Arabia he was compelled to return to India after this; he was imprisoned on 8th May 1965. The imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah further sparked their anger and animosity towards India. A political agitation started during his imprisonment. The Indian Army moved to suppress this political agitation but in the meantime, some of the people from Azad Kashmir joined that movement, and then in August 1965 Kashmir revolt began, during this situation, some Pakistan Armed Personnel entered Indian Kashmir, occupied Indian outposts, dry ports and attacked on Indian Army convoys and launched reprisals against India (Sagar, 2006). Muhammad Ali Chiragh described one of the factors, that India had launched their aggressive designs of attacking the Kargil sector in May 1965, but Pakistan complained to the United Nations and revived their areas back from Indian occupation but India again attacked Gujrat, Tithwal, Uri, and Poonch areas, Pakistan then launched its counter-offensive in September 1965 (Chiragh, 2016).

2.2. INITIATION OF OPERATION GIBRALTAR

Pakistan planned to train local Kashmiris of

Pakistan and send them to Indian Occupied Kashmir. These local Kashmiris had to increase their area of influence to engage Indian Kashmiris in this operation but they were unknown to this Operation. These guerilla fighters entered Indian Kashmir and crossed the border from 29th to 30th July 1965, their strength was approximately 7000, and initially, they produced a shock wave of attacks on India. Their main aim was to galvanize Indian Kashmir for revolt but they failed to achieve such a task because the Indian Government was informed about this and guerilla fighters were captured by the Indian Army (Bakr, 2017).

2.3. BHUTTO PLANNED OPERATION GIBRALTAR

There is a need for time to revise the Rann of Kutch and Operation Gibraltar incidents. After Rann of Kutch's victory Bhutto including Pakistan's armed forces became confident to start a direct war with India while launching Operation Gibraltar was an indication of it. It was Bhutto who planned Operation Gibraltar by giving an argument that *the nation would never forgive us if we did not take any action during the Muslim uprising in Kashmir*, therefore Bhutto planned to infiltrate Kashmir. Ayub Khan was very reluctant about Operation Gibraltar because he did not want any confrontation with India. Operation Gibraltar failed when 4 Pakistani Armed Personnel were captured by the Indian Army, Pakistan had no solution but to deny the Indian accusation of infiltrating Kashmir by Pakistan. Furthermore, when Pakistan faced an Indian attack on its borders, the masses were informed about Pakistan's good performance but when the War came to an end, the masses understood that Pakistan's performance was not well. Besides, the Ayub's decline began along with conflict with Bhutto (Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, 2018).

2.4. INDIA'S ATTACK ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINE, HAROLD WILSON VIEW ABOUT THIS WAR, AND REOCCUPATION OF PAKISTANI POSTS OCCUPIED BY INDIA DURING 1ST WEEK OF AUGUST

When India came to know about Pakistan's infiltration into Indian Kashmir, the Indian Army crossed the ceasefire line launched an offensive attack, and captured Pakistani border posts on 16th August 1965 (Khan, 2002). India's military strength was 4 times larger with heavy artillery on the occasion of attacking on Pakistan. Considered by Harold Wilson the initiation of this war had the worst consequences for the peace of South Asia as well as the world because that was a Cold War era between the USA and USSR. India did take care of international laws and principles but aimed to give military defeat to Pakistan. Ayub Khan claimed that those who infiltrated Indian Kashmir were the sons of their homeland and they aimed to save it. India claimed that those fighters were infiltrated by Pakistan in such retaliation Pakistan occupied Kargil posts on 15th August, shelled Awan village on 23rd August, and crossed the Ceasefire line on 24th August 1965, after which they reoccupied Uri, Poonch, and Tithwal while till the end of August a number of Indian posts were occupied by Pakistan (Chaudary, 1968).

3. OPERATION GRAND SLAM

3.1. WAR AT KASHMIR ON 1ST SEPTEMBER 1965

The Pakistan Army's first Military confrontation took place on 1st September 1965 when Indian Army attacked Pakistani forces in the disputed region of Kashmir, but Pakistan countered their attack and resisted Indian Army from entering into the Chamb area while Pakistan moved forward and was near to capture Akhnoor garrison of India under the command of Lieutenant General Akhtar Ali Malik who was a Commander of Kashmir but at the meantime, Ayub Khan did not want to lose his prestige, therefore, he replaced Akhtar Ali Malik and appointed Lieutenant General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan as Commander of Kashmir during warfare, because if he was to capture Akhnoor he would be called a national hero (Koreshi, 2004).

Under the command of General Yahya Khan, the Pakistan army proceeded towards Jaurian sectors and took military action against the

Indian Army General Yahya was congratulated by repulsing enemies while Musa Khan told Yahya *"You had your teeth in the enemy bite deeper and deeper till you destroy them"*. India attacked on Lahore sector and bombarded Wazirabad of Gujranwala, Punjab (Hussain, Ayub, Bhutto and Zia: How they fell victim to their own plans, 2010).

3.2. DECLARATION OF WAR BY SHASTRI AND INDIAN ATTACK ON LAHORE ON 6TH SEPTEMBER 1965 AND PAKISTAN'S OCCUPATION OF KHEM KHARAN ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965

Ayub asked General Musa Khan about the situation, he told Ayub that Operation Gibraltar failed while on the same day 2nd September 1965, the command of Operation Grand Slam was given to General Yahya Khan, Indian masses were informed by Prime Minister Shastri about an attack on Pakistan on 1st September 1965 while Mian Arshad Hussain Pakistan High Commissioner in India informed Pakistan's foreign office through communication with Turkish Embassy that India is going to launch an attack on Lahore on 6th September 1965, an Air force officer informed Ayub Khan about Indian advancement towards Lahore on 4:00 am. On the Indian Punjab Border side, Khem Kharan was captured by Pakistan on 8th September while the Indian Army desired to revert the territory to India but their attack was repulsed. On 9th September 1965, GHQ called tribesmen of Tribal Areas of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa for Lahore's defense (Gauhar, 2011).

3.3. AIR BATTLES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN DURING THE 1965 WAR FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO 11TH SEPTEMBER, PAKISTAN NAVY ATTACK AND INDIAN ATTACK ON SIALKOT SECTOR ON 9TH SEPTEMBER 1965

Later, on 6th September 1965 Indian Army planned to move towards the Lahore sector, and to capture it, their station was Sialkot and Sindh region of Pakistan. Indian Army had superiority over Pakistan because their strength was four times greater than Pakistan Army; they were

160000 to 180000 in number (Burke, 1975). An air attack was launched by Pakistan on the evening of 6th September 1965 and blew out 75 Indian aircraft while India launched an Air attack on 8th September capturing 19 Pakistani Aircraft. The Pakistan Navy attacked on Dwarka base of India which was 200 miles away from Karachi. During these incidents, on 9th September India launched a counter-offensive on Sialkot where the Indian attack was resisted by attacking through Tanks in the Chawinda area (Sattar, 2020). Moreover in the Sialkot conflict the largest tank battle took place after World War II. During this confrontation at Sialkot, the Indian Army lost 100 tanks to Pakistan (Azeem Tariq, 2020). An area in the Indian territory called Suleimanke-Fazilka, an attack between India and Pakistan also occurred there while Fazilka area was almost 100 miles away from Amritsar, other than Pakistan's 105 Infantry Brigade crossed the Indian border and captured 27 Indian villages. The Pakistan Air Force also attacked the Kalaikunda area of India on 7th September 1965 and damaged some of the Indian Aircrafts. Despite this fact, Pakistan Air Force took off their Aircrafts from Peshawar and Sargodha Air Bases and attacked Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara Air Bases. Indian Air Force also stepped up the retaliation against Pakistan's Air attacks but their targets were missed and showed unimpressive results Pakistan showed the power and capability of its Air Force. Moreover, Pakistan also claimed that five hunters and 4 Mysteries were shot down by Pakistan. From 10th September 1965, Pakistan was pressurized to end this war; diplomatic missions began on 11th September 1965 (Bajwa, 2014).

Pakistan's 4 armored brigade groups were advancing towards Kasur, Khem-Karan, Voltaha, and Nabipur but this advancement was countered by Commander Lieutenant Colonel Salim Caleb, who saved Beas bridge from crossing it by Pakistan Army on 8th September 1965 while an award of Maha Vir Chakra was announced for Salim Caleb on 17th September 1965 by All India Radio. Two days later, on 10th September 1965, Salim Caleb commanding a cavalry regiment of the Indian Army indulged in

tank attacks with Pakistan and captured 15 Patton tanks near Khem-Karan (Army, 2015).

3.4. AIR BATTLE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN CHAMB AND SIALKOT AREAS AND DACCA ATTACK ON BIHAR FROM 7TH SEPTEMBER TO 11TH SEPTEMBER 1965

One of the Officers of Pakistan Airforce Rafique attacked Halwara, he moved back towards Sargodha but his guns were jammed, decided to stay and guide their forces on one way or the other and to busy their enemy, but unfortunately, his Aircraft was shot down near Jullundur but he shot down three Indian Aircrafts near Chamb area. Pakistan had B-57 Aircrafts which were moved from Mauripur to Peshawar, from where they took off their planes and attacked Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, and Jamnagar. Later on 7th September West Pakistan got information that Dacca attacked an Indian Airbase at Kalaikunda at Bihar. Indian Airforce had an intention of capturing Lahore and bypassing Sialkot while a Pakistan Airforce busy at Khem-Karan was ordered to move towards Sialkot to counter the Indian threat there. On 11th September 1965 Air War took place at Sialkot which was a large one in which 19 Aircrafts were used, 10 were shot down and 3 were damaged. It was claimed by Pakistan that 28 Indian Aircrafts moved towards Pakistan of which 8 shot down and 14 were damaged. Pakistan did best in Air War 60 Aircrafts were used in which 20 were damaged (Khan A. M.).

3.5. BATTLE OF SIALKOT AND CHAWINDA FROM 7TH SEPTEMBER TO 22ND SEPTEMBER 1965

India advanced towards the Sialkot-Chawinda sector on 7th September and occupied two villages in Pakistan one was Maharajke and the other was Charwa, but Pakistan Army ordered the Gujranwala commanders on 11th September 1965 to move to Sialkot to defend it due to this action Indian Army moved back towards its border but later Indian Army moved from two sides, Charwa-Chawinda, and Kaloi-Pagowal, but the Indian attack on Kaloi-Pagowal route was repulsed by Pakistan Armed forces while from Charwa-Chawinda Indian forces reached

to Phillora, Sialkot was another route to Lahore and it was the reason that India wanted to occupy it. Pakistan Army put a great effort with fewer resources to counter the Sialkot attack but they compelled the Indians to withdraw. Later on, on 14th September 1965, a tank battle took place at Sialkot under the command of General Harbakhsh Singh, while this battle ended on the same day, Indian Army preparing their next strategy for capturing Chawinda. On the next two days, they again decided to launch an attack on Chawinda on the 17th and 18th of September but this plan was turned down while Pakistan launched an attack on Indian troops in which they lost. The battle of Chawinda was a complete failure for India on the battlefield (Nawaz, 2008). Indian Army again attacked the Chawinda area on the night of 15th September 1965 from the west but Pakistan countered their attack on 16th September by using Pakistani-anti tank weapons near the Buttar Dograndi area, while near Jassoran area, on 17th September Pakistan also defended it and defeated Indian Army there. During 18th /19th September 1965 Pakistan completely defended west of Chawinda but the Alhar station remained with India till the ceasefire. Then, under Operation Wind Up Pakistan completely removed Indians from Pakistani territory on the 21st/22nd of September 1965 (Cloughley, 2006).

3.6. DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO END 1965 WAR, END OF 1965 WAR, GAINS AND LOSSES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN 1965 WAR

Besides the Indian Defence, President Kosygin provided an opportunity to India and Pakistan by sending letters on the 27th August and on the 4th,

11th, 14th, and 17th of September to use the Soviet Union's good office for peace negotiation for ending this war. India accepted this letter while Pakistan agreed with it later ((Retd), 2015). In the 1965 War, India lost 387 tanks, 93 planes, and 6889 men while Pakistan made thousands of Indian Armed men as prisoners. Later, For the settlement of this war, Ayub-Shastri talks were proposed by U Thant, who also told the Security Council to halt this war, while on 16th September UNSC announced that they would not impose any sanction on Pakistan, and on 20th September the announced that Ceasefire Agreement to be taken place at noon 22nd September 1965. It was a wide conflict but did not resolve Kashmir while 740 square kilometers of area in India had been taken into possession by Pakistan. This author declared the Indian defeat in the 1965 War (Hussain, The Story of Pakistan's Politics and Politicians: Lengthening Shadows: From Advent of Pakistan to Fall of Ayub, 1970).

The 1965 War came to an end on 22nd September 1965, during this war Pakistan occupied 220 square miles area in the Rajasthan sector while India occupied 720 square miles area. In this war 12, 500 Indian casualties took place, 2700 were killed 1500 were made prisoner of war and 8400 were wounded. Whereas 3000 Pakistan Armed Personnel were killed, 2000 taken as prisoner, and 9000 were wounded while 200 tanks were lost by Pakistan, India lost 175-190 tanks to Pakistan. Furthermore, 32% armor was lost by Pakistan besides 27% armor was lost by India. In Air War Pakistan lost 43 Aircrafts instead India lost 59 Aircrafts (Dixit, 2002).

According to the Indian sources the results are given below:

	Pakistan	India
Killed	1033	9500
Wounded	2171	1100
Missing	630	1700
Tanks lost and damaged	165	475
Aircrafts	14	110

Pakistan occupied 1600 square miles area in Indian Territory while India gained 450 square miles area in Pakistan's territory. During this war, India showed its strength in the number of

armed forces but Pakistan made a courageous effort to defeat the enemy and defend Pakistan (Arif, 2016).

CHINA ON INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR

Pakistan was supported by Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. China warned India not to violate the Sikkim border and was supported by Pakistan. China referred 1965 War as a Soviet-American conflict in which India was the aggressive partner of Russia. The Chinese Foreign Minister condemned the Indian attack on Pakistan. During such war, China was responsible to both the States India and Pakistan for expansionist designs. (Syed, 1974). During the 1965 War, India showed their expansionist designs, they wanted to settle the Kashmir dispute not through diplomatic negotiation but by use of force, and for such purpose they crossed the ceasefire line at the end of August 1965. A statement was issued by China that *"The area is a disputed territory left over by history. The logic of India is that my territory is mine but yours is also mine. The Chinese government and people fully sympathize and support the solemn and just stand of the Pakistan government is opposing Indian policy of military expansionism"* (Rais).

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND TASHKENT AGREEMENT

United Nations adopted a resolution which states that: *The security council demands that a ceasefire should take effect on Wednesday 22nd September 1965 at 0700 hour GMT and calls upon both governments to issue an order for a ceasefire at that moment and subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the position held by them before 5th August 1965*". On the same day, it was announced to Bhutto that if the Security Council did not resolve the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan would quit the United Nations. India accused Pakistan of attacking on Fazilka Area without causing any damage and also demanded the removal of Pakistani forces from Kashmir while Pakistan advised for plebiscite to give the right to people of Kashmir to decide their future (Khan H. , Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 2017).

The Tashkent Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on 10th January 1966, according to

this, both the states had to accept the obligations of the United Nations they should make to effort in the best way for the development of better relations with each other. Diplomatic relations were to be restored while both armies should move to pre-5th August 1965 positions before 25th February 1965. Both parties would not interfere in the internal affairs of each other. High Commissioners of both states had to be restored to their posts while the joint Indian-Pakistani bodies had to be established to take further steps to promote bilateral relations (Council, 1966).

AFTERMATH OF THE 1965 WAR

When the 1965 war came to an end, the United States called off its Military Advisory Groups and also stopped its Military aid to Pakistan which moved Pakistan into a difficult situation. Besides this, the United States also delayed its aid to Pakistan for the 3rd Five Year Plan but this plan was initiated through domestic sources. Moreover, India got military assistance from the Soviet Union and maintained good relations with them while United States-Pakistan relations soured after the 1965 War moreover, the GNP of Pakistan reduced to 3.8% instead of 4.7% in 1963-64 (Fieldman, 2001).

Despite this fact, internally Ayub Government was threatened, and differences arose between Ayub Khan and Bhutto about the Tashkent Declaration, Bhutto had the view that Pakistan lost the battle on talk tables, then within a year Bhutto established the Pakistan People's Party on the 4th April 1967 which became a mass party under shadow of Bhutto. Ayub Khan lost his control over his Government, establishment, and opposition, and Bhutto student protests were launched all over Pakistan moreover he indulged in sickness and weakness which is also one of the causes of his decline. Besides this Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman presented his 6-point formula and thus at last he resigned from the post of President and gave all his powers to General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan on 25th March 1969 (Talbot, 1998).

CONCLUSION

Pakistan underestimated the Indian Military capabilities after the defeat in the Rann of Kutch

skirmishes and became overconfident. Operation Gibraltar began because of this misconception that both countries were receiving United States Defence resources while India was also receiving Russian Defence resources. Operation Gibraltar failed when India captured Pakistani guerrilla Fighter in Kashmir but Lieutenant General Akhtar Ali Malik captured the areas in Kashmir near Akhnoor Cantt. The Indian Attack on Pakistan both at Lahore sector and Sialkot was a complete failure as the Pakistan Army bravely defended both sectors and did not allow India to capture Pakistan's territory and resisted them at both sectors.

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